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Non-Therapeutic Experimentation 
on Children: Moral Issues 
Rev. Robert H. Byrne 
A priest of the diocese of Saginaw, Mich., Father Byrne prepared 
this paper for Linacre Quarterly while a doctoral student at the Acca· 
demia Alfonsiana in Rome in 1977. 
In the October, 1976 issue of New Catholic World magazine, Dr. 
Robert Cooke, vice chancellor for health services at the University of 
Wisconsin, stated that "consent" is the most significant medical-
ethical issue society faces today. 1 From my own brief survey of med-
ical-moral literature and three years of pastoral service which often 
included contact with families and physicians in hospital situations, I 
have to agree with Dr. Cooke. Consent that is "reasonably free" and 
" adequately" informed is the framework sought in any medical pro-
cedure, therapeutic or non-therapeutic , but in our present situation of 
a highly developed and specialized medical technology, whether this 
kind of consent is always possible has become problematic. 
There are many aspects to the issue of consent, so in this paper I 
would like to focus on one aspect: consent in regard to non-thera· 
peutic (experimental) procedures with children . This study points to 
one controversial problem in particular : presumed or "proxy " con-
sent. When non-therapeutic procedures are considered with regard to 
children, the mentally retarded, or others judged incompetent to make 
their own decisions, it causes us to look more closely at what is 
involved in this type of presumed consent in any situation. 
To my knowledge, one of the most helpful discussions of this issue 
can be presented by comparing the differing opinions published by 
Paul Ramsey2 and Richard McCormick. 3 In this paper I will briefly 
present a summary of each position, the analysis given by William May 
in The Linacre Quarterly, and then present my own analysis and 
comment. 
Ramsey's Position 
Ramsey's treatment of this issue of experimentation on children is 
based on one important principle : the relationship between a patient 
and a physician or between a subject and an investigator is a partner-
ship of two human subjects. They are "joint adventurers" in a com-
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mon cause. Consent expresses or establishes that relationship and the 
requirement of consent sustains it. Ramsey calls this " the Canon of 
Loyalty." This consent must be reasonably free and adequately 
informed to insure that a human subject is not being used as an object 
by another. Ramsey admits only one exception to this general require-
ment: in cases where persons are in extreme danger and cannot them-
selves give explicit consent, consent may properly be assumed or 
implied. The doctor is in the special position of being able to answer 
that need so that presumed consent does not do violence to the dig-
nity of that person as a human subject. 
Experimentation, like therapy, is a voluntary association of persons 
in a common cause and this association can only be established and 
expressed by the requirement of informed and free consent. In regard 
to the situation of medical experimentation on children or incompe-
tents, Ramsey states his position clearly: 
Children who cannot give a mature or informed consen~ should not be made 
the subjects of medical experimentation unless , other remedies having failed 
to relieve their grave illness, it is reasonable to believe that the administra· 
tion of a dl"Ug yet untested or insufficiently tested on human beings, or t he 
performance of an untried operation , m ay further the patient's own 
recovery. 4 
The conclusion for non-therapeutic medical experimentation on 
children is clear: when there is no possible relation to the child's 
recovery, a child is not to be made a mere object in medical experi-
mentation for the sake of good to come. To even attempt to consent 
for such experimentation on behalf of a child is "to treat a child as 
not a child." It would be to treat a child as an adult who has con-
sented to make himself a "joint adventurer in the common cause of 
medical research." 5 Anticipating the argument that consent could be 
presumed on the part of the child, Ramsey states quite bluntly: "If 
the grounds for this are alleged to be the presumptive or implied 
consent of the child, that must simply be characterized as a violent 
and a false presumption." 6 
Non-therapeutic experimentation must be based on true consent if 
it is to be a human enterprise and since children cannot give true 
consent, they cannot be subjected to this type of experimentation. 
Ramsey calls this our canon of loyalty (as adults) to children. When a 
child becomes an adult, he can volunteer for such experiments, but no 
one can volunteer a child or anyone else for non-therapeutic medical 
experimentation. 
Finally, Ramsey looks at Anglo-American law and notes that pro-
tection is given to persons from harmful invasion of the body without 
proper consent, and from unconsented touching, even if no harm is 
done . This latter situation of non-harmful touching involves freedom 
from coercion to the will of another and wrongs another by doing 
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something to him without his consent. Ramsey concludes that chil-
dren are protected by those same laws, even from "offensive touch-
ing" which is not physicially harmful. 
In summary, to bring a child within the ambit of medical investiga-
tion requires: 1) some relation to the child's own treatment, and 
2) informed consent on the part of the parent or guardian. The con-
sent on the part of the parent or guardian concerns the evaluation of 
the hazards to the child involved with using an experimental pro-
cedure for therapeutic purposes. It can be noted that Ramsey criticizes 
the Ethical Guidelines for Clinical Investigation prepared by the Amer-
ican Medical Association for not meeting these standards for proxy 
consent. 
McCormick's Position 
McCormick examines the situation where proxy (meaning "pre-
sumed") consent is considered legitimate to see if a guideline can be 
established for applying to the more problematic situation of non-
therapeutic experimentation. Presumed consent is considered legit-
imate in the therapeutic situation where procedures are intended to be 
of benefit to the health and life of the subject who is incapable of 
giving consent for himself. The parents or guardians can give consent 
because the incapable subject can reasonably be presumed to give 
consent if he were able to do so . 
The reasonableness of this presumption is due to the fact that life 
and health are real human goods and all men have an obligation to 
pursue the human good because they are men. Thus McCormick 
argues that parental consent is morally legitimate where therapy on 
the child is involved because we know that life and health are goods 
for the child, that he would choose them because he ought to choose 
the good of life as long as this life remains, all things considered , a 
human good. Thus it is reasonable to presume that the child would 
consent to the procedure in question because he ought to do so. 
On the basis of this analysis of the therapeutic situation, McCor-
mick moves to the situation where non-therapeutic experimental pro-
cedures are involved. He first asks: are there other things which the 
child ought, as a human being, to choose precisely insofar as they are 
goods definitive of his own well-being? He answers that we are social 
beings and the goods that define our growth are goods that reside also 
in others, so that it can be good for one to pursue and support this 
good in others. Therefore when it factually is good, we may say that 
one ought to 'consent to such a procedure. Finally, if this "ought" is 
true of all of us to a point and within limits, it is no less true of the 
child. He would choose to consent to these non-therapeutic pro-
cedures because he, as a human person, ought to do so. 
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As I understand McCormick's argumentation, there are some non-
therapeutic procedures that involve no discernible risk, discomfort, or 
inconvenience, yet promise genuine hope for general benefit. We all 
have a general responsiblity to help in the process of controlling 
diseases and maintaining health. Since it is good that all of us as 
human beings share in these experiments, and hence good that we 
ought to do so, then "a presumption of consent where children are 
involved is reasonable and proxy consent becomes legitimate." 7 
McCormick is quick to stress that this presumed obligation on the 
part of the child is true only up to a point and within limits: experi-
ments that would involve no discernible risks, no notable pain, no 
notable inconvenience, and yet hold promise of a considerable benefit 
to others. At the same time, there can be no question of presuming 
consent in other situations where risk or discomfort might be 
involved, even though there would seem to be great benefit to be 
gained for others. This kind of "consequentialist calculus" would go 
beyond the boundary of reasonably presumed consent. 
In summary, McCormick argues that from the situation of legit-
imate proxy consent in situations of therapeutic experimental pro-
cedures on children, one can infer moral justification of proxy consent 
in purely experimental situations under very limited conditions. 
May's Evaluation of Ramsey and McCormick 
In his article, William May specifically examines McCormick's posi-
tion in the light of Ramsey's analysis, and then adds a further helpful 
element. 8 According to May, any "proxy" consent when a person 
other than the subject of the procedure is authorizing that person's 
participation in it is false consent based on false presumption. Consent 
is a human activity and requires knowledge and freedom of choice in 
order to exist. Children or mentally incompetent or unconscious per-
sons (adult) are not capable of knowledge or freedom of choice, so 
they cannot be classed as "moral agents" who are capable of giving 
consent. 
On this basis, May criticizes McCormick's analysis of the thera-
peutic situation with regard to children. Parents cannot presume con-
sent on the part of the child on the basis that he ought to so choose if 
he could because the child is not a moral agent and is not subject to 
moral obligations. The reason justifying medical treatment of children 
or any other victims is the obligation on the parents of medical per-
sonnel to that person, not a presumed consent on the part of the 
person himself. So May feels that any "proxy" consent as presumed 
consent is false consent. It is consent by the parents for certain means 
to be used in order to fulfill their own obligation to help their child in 
his need, but not a presumption of the consent of the child. May 
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therefore agrees with Ramsey's analysis: children are not to be made 
subject to non-therapeutic experimentation, even to the minimum of 
offensive touching. 
Evaluation 
What emerges from all this is that there are two different issues in 
the discussion of non-therapeutic experimentation on children. First, 
there is the question of " presumed consent" and secondly, there is the 
matter of the "canon of loyalty" with regard to children. Since they 
are different issues, it is important that they be kept distinct because 
the conclusions drawn from them are not the same conclusions. 
The question of presumed consent: In regard to presumed consent, 
both Ramsey and McCormick point to the crucial importance of con-
sent, but the special situation of children brings up some difficulties in 
regard to any kind of " presumed" consent. As I first understood it, 
presumed consent required a reasonable basis for the presumption. In 
the case of an adult, the reasonable basis referred to the will that the 
patient had shown by his previous actions and on that basis, the next 
of kin could "presume " his consent in regard to a certain medical 
procedure. However, after examining this issue in the case of children, 
I have to conclude that presumed consent, whether involving an 
unconscious adult, a mentally retarded person, or a child is fiction 
rather than fact. I agree with May that the real basis for allowing 
therapeutic medical procedures is the responsibility of the parents, 
guardians, next of kin, or the physician to the person in need. It is not 
a presumption at all because the author of the consent is not the 
patient. 
The content of the consent given in such a situation concerns the 
type of treatment that is to be given, especially in regard to relatively 
extraordinary means. In the case of an unconscious adult, the next of 
kin can make a "presumption" of what the patient would want done 
if he were conscious because of what they had seen him chose in the 
past. They saw him act in different situations and this knowledge can 
help them make the decision of what means should be used , but this is 
only part of their obligation to that person. This is not a presumption 
of an "ought " on the part of the patient to use ordinary means to 
preserve his life, but a recognition that other persons have obligations 
to see that ordinary means are used to help this person in need. 
Relatively extraordinary means may be used and that judgment, I 
think, should be based on a knowledge of what that patient, if an 
adult, had shown by his choices in the past. 
In the situation involving a child, there is a real differepce from the 
situation described above because the child has no history as a moral 
agent. There is no basis from past actions to make any kind of pre-
sumption of what the child would want. The parents, then, must 
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decide on the basis of their own obligation and judgment whether 
relatively extraordinary means should be used. The real basis of con-
sent is the judgment of the parents and that consent must be reason-
ably free and adequately informed. This type of reasoning would seem 
to be supported in legal practice where the court orders the use of 
relatively ordinary means (e.g., a blood transfusion) to treat a child in 
danger of death when the parents will not give their consent for the 
procedure. The state is acting from its obligation to its citizens and 
not from any presumption on the part of the child. 
In situations involving non-therapeutic experimental procedures, I 
would conclude that "presumed " consent is not a valid category in 
regard to adults or children. Such procedures should be allowed for 
adults only if they have left prior authorization or consent in the form 
of a will. As for children, I agree with Ramsey and May that non-
therapeutic experimental procedures are not to be used, but I would 
add one qualification. This conclusion brings up the second issue 
referred to above: the canon of loyalty to children. 
The canon of loyalty to children: This is a very important obliga-
tion, but a very difficult one to translate into practice. The child has 
rights as a human person, but he is in no position to defend himself, so 
he needs parents or guardians to defend them . Yet in the defense of 
those rights, the child can make some contribution to how those rights 
are understood by the parent or guardian. For example, in cases where 
custody of a child is in question because of a divorce, if the child is 
old enough to express himself, the judge will often talk to the child to 
try to determine with which parent the child would be most happy to 
live. The final decision depends on the judge, not on the wishes of the 
child, yet those wishes can be one element contributing to his judg-
ment. 
I think this type of reasoning can also apply to a situation involving 
what Ramsey calls the " inviolability of the body. " Law does protect 
the body of the individual from invasion of another, but when the 
situation of invasion involves an adult, the law is not applicable unless 
the person makes a complaint. In cases of non-harmful touching, the 
complaint is not presumed but must be expressed by the person. In 
the case of a child, parents and guardians can make such a complaint, 
but in order to be reasonable, their judgment must be based on some 
input from the child. A child usually makes it clear whether h e wants 
to be touched or not. So I do not think that children are being treated 
as objects in experimental situations where there is no discernible risk 
or undue discomfort with the consent of the parents or guardians on 
the grounds that parents can allow an adult to touch their child when 
the child by his own actions obviously does not object. The child has 
not given the consent and has not made the judgment, but has given 
some expression or input to the parents who give the consent. 
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In conclusion, I agree with Ramsey and May in regard to the issue 
of presumed consent, but not with the extent of their conclusion. I 
think that when simple experimental procedures involve no discernible 
risk or undue discomfort, yet offer hope for reasonable benefit for 
others, parents can give their consent for such procedures, taking 
account of the input they receive from the child. Thus I agree with 
McCormick's conclusion about non-harmful experimentation with 
children, but not with his lines of argument. This paper began with the 
recognition that consent is a difficult issue and after struggling with 
the issues pointed up with regard to children, I appreciate the diffi-
culties even more. 
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